INTRODUCTION
The European Union (EU) has long been seen as a distinctive or sui generis actor in international politics, epitomised by the plethora of conceptualisations of EU power, including: civilian, normative, transformative, post-modern, ethical, smart and soft. What many of these conceptualisations have in common is that the EU is perceived (rightly or wrongly) as focusing more on 'milieu goals' rather than 'possession goals' 2 with generally more (although not entirely) benign motivations. More recently the EU's distinctiveness as an international security provider has been more pragmatically couched in the language of the 'Comprehensive Approach', whereby the EU seeks to address security challenges holistically; something NATO cannot do, being primarily a military organisation, and other international organisations, such as the United Nations, are struggling with. However, these conceptualisations of the EU as a distinctive international security provider are being challenged by the evolving security environment. In particular, over the last 15
years there has been a significant trend within EU security strategies towards the blurring of internal and external security. This increasing focus on the interconnections between internal and external security threats suggests the emergence of a European security continuum where geographic (domestic and foreign) and/or bureaucratic (civilian and military) distinctions begin to erode. This is particularly pertinent as the EU's two overarching security policies, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 3 and the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ), increasingly transcend the internal-external divide, with AFSJ operating inside and outside the EU and CSDP drawing on both civilian and military instruments. The central proposition of the article is that the internal-external divide is being undermined in three ways, (a) the changing nature of the threats (b) changing threat perceptions, and (c) the EU's responses. However, not all security challenges blur these boundaries to the same degree or in the same ways: some (such as organised crime) may transcend geographic boundaries; some (such as state failure) may transcend bureaucratic boundaries; others (such as terrorism) may transcend both; while a few (such as interstate conflict) may transcend neither. Hence, this security continuum can act as a framework to assess the nature of the security threats identified by the EU and its' responses to those threats in terms of a dual blurring of the geographic (domestic-foreign) and bureaucratic (civilian-military) dimensions of security. At one end of the continuum are the transboundary 4 challenges where geographic and bureaucratic divides are increasingly irrelevant. At the other end challenges are still demarcated by both geographic and bureaucratic division. While this trend is not new, the prominence of claims about an internal-external security nexus has increased significantly with implications for the EU as an international security provider. As Kirchner has argued: 'the extent to which the EU can be deemed a security provider depends considerably on the definition of security or, more precisely, on the type of security threat that is envisaged.'
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This emerging European security continuum creates both a practical and normative challenge for the EU as an international security provider. First, it creates significant challenges for the EU's institutional architecture and capability profile, which are mired in bureaucratic turf wars and struggling to overcome the legacy of the EU's pillar structure. Second, the EU's responses to the increasing interconnections between internal and external security problematizes perceptions of the EU as a distinctive normative 6 or civilian power 7 pursuing 'milieu goals'. These conceptualisations construct the EU as a security provider seeking to act as an exemplar and a 'force for good' in the international system based on promoting shared norms and values such as liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights, utilising different capabilities and being driven by more benign motivations, which focus on goals that others, indeed all, can benefit from (milieu goals) rather than pursuing goals that benefit only itself (possession goals). As the security agenda widens and the EU's responses tend toward protecting its own interests first, coercively if necessary, its distinctiveness begins to erode. Yet, the emerging security continuum also provides an opportunity for the EU to reframe and reassert its distinctiveness as an international security provider, through making a reality of the Comprehensive Approach (CA) by drawing holistically on the full spectrum of instruments at its disposal, while limiting the shift away from pursuing milieu goals. and capability framework is limiting the CA's success, while the EU's responses to the blurring of internal and external security undermine its distinctiveness as a normative international security provider. The article structures this analysis and argument in three parts. First, it examines the EU's framing of security, with a particular focus on its discourse on the blurring of the internal-external divide, because the type of security threat will influence the nature of the EU as a security provider.
This discourse is made up of the EU's security strategies and policies, which are analysed to identify when, why and how the blurring of internal and external security is invoked. Second, the article draws out the practical implications of this discursive framing for EU security practices. In doing so it examines the institutional and capability opportunities and obstacles created by the emerging European security continuum. Finally, the article analyses the conceptual and normative consequences of these changing discourses and practices of security for understandings of the EU as an international security provider.
FRAMING SECURITY: THE EU'S INTERNAL-EXTERNAL DISCOURSE
Following the launch in 1999 of CSDP and AFSJ there has been a clear discursive trend across EU security strategies to make explicit the increasing connections between internal and external security and, therefore, the need to improve coordination between internal and external security institutions. Report, the 2010 Internal Security Strategy (ISS) and the Commission's ISS in Action, identify an ever expanding range of challenges: terrorism, cybercrime, cybersecurity, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), illegal migration, energy security, organised crime, state failure, environmental change, regional conflict, natural and man-made disasters and border security.
As the number and complexity of security challenges increased, so did references to the increasing linkages between internal and external security. As Catherine Ashton, the former High This blurring is supported by the second striking commonality of these two security strategies;
overlapping threats and challenges, despite the strategies' different orientations. The ESS is externally orientated, seeking to identify the threats and challenges within the international system which are likely to affect the security of the EU, its member states, and its citizens. Meanwhile the ISS is directed at the challenges to citizen's security originating from within the EU. Yet a number of security challenges appear in both strategies, including: terrorism and radicalisation, organised crime, arms trafficking, cybercrime and cybersecurity, energy security, neighbourhood and border security, and resilience to accidents and disasters whether natural or man-made. While the ISS and the emerging security continuum. Coordination needs to be improved in three areas to enhance the EU's ability to contribute to international security. First, the tools available through the Commission (such as aid, development, conflict prevention and civil protection) need to be better coordinated with the tools available under the CFSP and CSDP. Second, both the Commission and the EEAS could draw more systematically on the instruments and expertise available through JHA, covering police and judicial cooperation. Third, the divisions between civilian and military capabilities also need to be bridged, both within CFSP/CSDP and between CFSP/CSDP and other policy areas.
The traditional understanding of internal and external security capabilities is based on the European state model. This ensured that threats to security from within the borders were tackled by civilian policing and threats to security from outside the borders were managed by the military. While, this distinction was never clear cut, EU security strategies suggest this divide is blurring at the EU level. Given the CA's focus on external security it is unsurprising that efforts to improve the coordination of capabilities have been mostly within the EEAS and CSDP. Yet, in the longer term synergies in capabilities across institutions and policy areas are crucial. The EU already accepts that it must enhance its capacity to act externally in order to protect internal security. 54 As Rees has argued, it is time the EU realises that the inflexible separation of instruments for foreign policy and internal security is no longer appropriate as transnational challenges defy such distinctions. 55 Such an acknowledgement would enhance the EU's claims to being an international security provider by strengthening 'the availability of, and a capacity to utilize, policy instruments.' 56 The EU has, in principle, available to it the full range of instruments expected of an international security provider, from aid to diplomacy and from economic sanctions to military force. In fact it may be uniquely placed in this regard, thus providing the opportunity to enhance its distinctiveness. Through improving the coordination between capabilities, especially civil-military, it will move closer to fulfilling its ambition to be a distinctive international security provider capable of tackling the complexities of the emerging European security continuum.
PROVIDING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY?
The emerging European security continuum has been partly driven by changes in the nature of threats. However, it has also been significantly driven by changes in threat perception, by the EU's security discourse, and its efforts to adapt its institutions and capabilities. Hence, the politics and practice of providing security are as important in shaping the security continuum as the actual threats. Politics and practice also influence the prospects for nature of the EU as an international security provider.
The first section of the article argued that the blurring of internal and external security in the EU's security discourse provides an opportunity to rearticulate its distinctiveness as an international security provider. The EU's Cybersecurity Strategy illustrates the EU's potential to provide a comprehensive approach to security, combining internal and external challenges, institutions and capabilities. This strategy drew from departments across the EEAS (Global Affairs, Directorate K (security policy) and the EUMS) and Commission (DG HOME and DG CNECT), spanning the challenges of cybercrime, cybersecurity and cyber-defence. However, negotiating such a comprehensive strategy was complicated by significant institutional differences, to the extent that the strategy almost became a solely CFSP communication. 57 This would have undermined the comprehensiveness, distinctiveness, and added value the EU could bring to tackling this security challenge. It would have also failed to understand the multifaceted and intertwined nature of cyber security/crime/defence, which transcends the internal-external divide both geographically and bureaucratically. Similarly, the development of the EU Maritime Security Strategy involved internal and external, civilian and military bodies from the EEAS (EUMS, Directorate K, and CMPD) and Commission (DG MARE and DG MOVE). Another example of the potential of the EU to bring together internal and external security actors is the aforementioned Crisis Platform, which has generally been seen to have been beneficial in, at the very least, bringing the relevant institutions, directorates and units together. 58 If only to exchange information this already improves coordination and is the first step towards a comprehensive approach to security. These strategies and developments, and the institutional frictions they overcame, illustrate that the CA might be securing a foothold within the EU's nascent security culture, thereby enhancing the EU's distinctiveness as a multifaceted international security provider.
Finally, the 2013 Joint Communication from the EEAS and Commission on the Comprehensive
Approach provides an opportunity to better address the emerging security continuum. While it focuses on 'external conflict and crises' it does so as a way of mitigating 'the negative effects -for the EU, its citizens and its internal security -of insecurity and conflict elsewhere.' 59 The communication has an entire section devoted to 'linking policies and internal and external action', which highlights that 'EU internal policies and actions can have significant external effects…likewise, external action and policy can also impact on EU internal dynamics.' 60 In the longer term it might be worth considering a comprehensive approach that brings together internal and external security. Such an approach would be beneficial for two reasons. First, the nature of the threats and challenges identified by the EU are increasingly transboundary; occurring inside and outside the EU and requiring a range of different institutions and capabilities to tackle them. Second, such a comprehensive approach would provide a platform for overcoming the EU's institutional stove-piping, bureaucratic turf wars, and divergent security cultures. There are significant difficulties and dangers in trying to develop such an all-encompassing approach, but not doing so might be problematic given the emerging security continuum. It would also be a missed opportunity to rearticulate the EU's distinctiveness as a security provider. can be a security provider. 63 While EU security strategies overlap in their threat assessments there remain differences over priorities, approaches, and even whether some challenges are (or should) be considered and addressed as security issues. There is a longstanding debate, within academia and the EU, about the advantages and dangers of 'securitising' policy issues. 64 In the EU this is related to turf wars over which institution has responsibility for which issue and, therefore, over how it is framed.
This can be seen in the Commission's securitisation rhetoric and technologies in policy areas such as immigration, organised crime and border control. Yet other branches of the Commission, such as DG ECHO (Humanitarian Aid), fiercely resist securitisation. DG ECHO is adamant humanitarian aid should be neutral, impartial, and independent focusing on humanitarian need. 65 For DG ECHO security is framed as human security. Hence, it is important not to be seen as part of the actions of the EEAS or other parts of the Commission, while recognising ECHO's role and contributing to the CA. It does so through the mantra of "in but out", whereby they aim to be part of the "overall effect" through coordination and collaboration but ensure the principles of neutrality and the humanitarian needs based approach remain. 66 This effort to ensure neutrality, and, crucially the perception of neutrality, has been complicated by the introduction of an EEAS Crisis Response department, with a responsibility for the overall planning, organisation and coordination of crisis related activities. This overlaps with both the civil protection and humanitarian aid remit of ECHO, creating significant institutional friction and potentially undermining the distinctiveness of EU security provision.
This friction is exacerbated by the EEAS Situation Room replicating some of the functions of DG ECHO's Emergency Response Centre (ERC) and was heightened further by the suggestion in the 2013 EEAS Review that the Situation Room should be co-located with the ERC. 67 Creating a single 24/7 ERC has the potential to streamline capabilities, reduce duplication (and therefore costs) and, in the spirit of the CA, bring increased coordination. However, it would also be seen as infringing on the impartiality and neutrality of DG ECHO as it would potentially put military personnel (or at least personnel with a defence remit) inside the Commission (those 'Watchkeeper' staff which were in the EUMS and are now co-located in the Situation Room). This raises concerns about the securitisation and militarisation of crises, while also antagonising the EUMS who highly value the Watchkeeper capability. 68 More practically, it raises difficulties in terms of the size of the facility and its lack of secure communications. Finally, such a move would not enhance coordination with DG HOME's crisis room, which focuses on internal security. While the institutional battles could, eventually, be worked through, the fundamental differences in understandings of security will be harder to overcome. It would move the EU away from the human security approach, thereby affecting the distinctive nature of the EU as an international security provider.
Differing conceptions of security would also come to the fore if, as the EEAS Review calls for, the EEAS was to 'reinforce its capacity' to deal with issues such as energy security, environmental protection and climate change, migration, and counter terrorism. These policy areas are primarily the responsibility of the Commission and there are heated debates (even within the EEAS) over the value of enhancing the EEAS' capacity to address these issues. 69 Instead, as the Commission has the expertise and resourcing, the focus should be on improving communication, cooperation and coordination between the EEAS and the Commission; something the dual hatting of the HR/VP did not really facilitate under the first HR/VP Catherine Ashton. 70 Initial signs are that the new HR/VP, Federica Mogherini, is seeking to prioritise enhancing the EEAS-Commission relationship. In particular, including the former Director General of the Commission's DG HOME, Stafano
Manservisi, as her Chef de Cabinet may facilitate greater coordination between internal and external security. 71 More fundamentally, moving these policy areas, if only in part, into the EEAS has the potential to reshape the normative basis of the EU as an international security provider. With immigration policy heavily securitised, the EU is often perceived as being less interested in the plight of the migrants (milieu goals or human security) than the domestic politics of it member states (strategic interests or possession goals). With the migration crisis in the Mediterranean escalating and Frontex's Triton mission off the coast of Italy being criticised for its small size and focus on border control rather than search and rescue, the pressures on the normative approach of the EU are intensifying. Operation
Triton seems to reinforce the image of fortress Europe with navy and air force assets seen to be protecting the interests of EU security rather than acting in the interests of human security. This undermines the EU's desire to be seen as a distinctive normative security provider acting as a 'force for good' on the international stage.
The emerging European security continuum, while opening up opportunities for the EU to assert itself as a security provider, is likely to reshape these normative conceptualisations. If an internalexternal security nexus exists then a seemingly logical response is to ensure greater cooperation, coordination and even integration of the EU's internal and external institutions and capabilities.
However, the consequences of such developments have drawn criticism from a number of scholars, such as Dider Bigo. 72 The central concern relates to the issue of the securitisation and even militarisation of policies that should remain in the realm of 'normal politics' and can lead to 'exceptional' security measures becoming the norm. 73 It is not just the EU discourse that securitises policy areas, the EU's security instruments and technologies are, as Balzacq argues, at least as important. 74 These developments challenge the perception of the EU as a distinctive security provider with more (although not entirely) benign motivations. It is difficult to make a case for the EU as distinctive civilian, normative or ethical power while its approaches to managing immigration are interpreted as reinforcing notions of 'fortress Europe' and its counter-terrorism policies are criticised for emphasising security over justice and liberty.
Similarly, having access to a range of coercive instruments (not just military) may undermine notions of the EU as a normative power, focused on human security. 75 While there are debates about means and ends, the overall perception (from within and outside of the EU) is that as the EU engages with an expanding array of security issues, utilising an increasingly interconnected range of instruments, its distinctiveness as a normative power (if it is) is in danger of being undermined. A number of scholars, such as Karen Smith and Ian Manners, raise concerns that developing a military capability negates the EU's claims to being a civilian or normative power. 76 While it is difficult to argue that CSDP has militarised the EU, securitisation has occurred, but driven more by the Commission's internal security agenda than the EEAS's external agenda. This is supported in other policy areas by scholars, such as Hette and Soderbaum, who suggested that the EU is moving towards a 'soft imperialism' through the more coercive use of conditionality in its enlargement and neighbourhood strategies, undermining its civilian and normative power claims, 77 and, therefore, its distinctiveness.
Similarly, as the EU identifies and engages with this emerging security continuum, the interchanging use of civilian, gendarmerie and military capabilities to tackle issues such as organised crime, immigration, civil protection and terrorism risks the perception of the EU shifting away from its more benign, civilian or normative characteristics.
A final possible implication of the eroding internal-external security divide is that calls for greater coordination and even integration of committees, working groups and institutions, raise significant questions about oversight, accountability, legitimacy and transparency. In particular it becomes increasingly problematic to maintain oversight and clear lines of accountability as the formal and informal networks of agencies, institutions, experts and working groups expand. For example, Europol, an EU agency, explicitly operates as a network structure, 78 both within the EU (Frontex), but also increasingly with third countries (the USA) and organisations (the UN Office on Drugs and Crime). In addition, the numerous agencies providing information to Europol have their own networks so tracing the origins of information or keeping track of who uses the data Europol collates, and how, becomes very difficult. These developments, often leading to a more opaque network of security actors, can undermine perceptions about the legitimacy of EU as an international security provider.
CONCLUSION
This article has argued that the EU's discourse on the blurring of internal and external security is a significant factor shaping the potential for, and understandings of, the EU as an international security provider. Its importance is not just for the EU's institutional architecture and capability profile, but also for its enduring ambition to be a distinctive (normative) international security provider. Being distinct is important for the EU in at least two ways. First, institutional distinctiveness is, according implication for the EU as an international security provider. As internal and external threats become, at least rhetorically, conflated the EU is increasingly framing its role in international security as indispensable for protecting the EU, its member states and its citizens. This moves the EU away from its normative power self-image with a responsibility to act as a 'force of good' in the world. The
European security continuum might be reorienting the EU towards pursuing Wolfers' possession goals rather than milieu goals.
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The European security continuum, therefore, provides an opportunity both practically and normatively to carve out a distinctive, comprehensive role for the EU as an international security
provider. Yet, the obstacles of institutional and capability coordination mean this ambition is still some way off being realised and, more profoundly, the notion of the EU's distinctiveness as a normative power focused on 'milieu goals' is in danger of being seriously undermined. 82 Wolfers, Arnold, Discord and Collaboration, Op. Cit.
